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ESSAY
THE DEMISE OF
DRUG DESIGN LITIGATION:
DEATH BY FEDERAL PREEMPTION
AARON D. TWERSKI*
For over half a century, courts and commentators have disagreed as to the
standards governing liability for drug design cases. In the last several years, the
United States Supreme Court decided two cases that will have a profound effect
on whether drug design defect cases, in general, are federally preempted. In
PLIVA v. Mensing and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, the Court
preempted product liability actions for failure to warn and design defect against
the manufacturers of generic drugs that met the FDA standard for the brand
name drug. In these cases, the Court made wide-ranging statements that are
applicable to brand name drugs as well. This Essay finds the Bartlett Court
erred in having read New Hampshire law too narrowly. At the same time, the
Court’s reasoning has opened a debate as to the scope of federal preemption for
brand name drugs. This Essay argues that the sweeping language in these two
cases leads to the conclusion that common law drug design cases involving
brand name drugs will fall prey to federal preemption.
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INTRODUCTION
More than half a century has passed since the American Law
Institute adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
imposing strict liability for the sale of defective products.1 From the
outset, the rules governing liability for design defects for prescription
drugs have been shrouded in mystery.2 In particular, the history of the

1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
2. See, e.g., DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 36–37 (3d ed. 2015)
[hereinafter OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW] (highlighting how secondary design
issues create special problems because companies may not be required to offer
optional safety devices); George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1087–89 (2000) (pointing
out that exemptions in the updates of the Restatement of Torts do not resolve issues
around defects in prescription drugs and medical devices); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., The
Continuing Search for Proper Perspective: Whose Reasonableness Should Be at Issue in a
Prescription Product Design Defect Analysis?, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 233, 233–34 (1999)
(exploring the two approaches to design defects in prescription products: “reasonable
physician” versus “reasonable manufacturer”); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking
Conscious Design Liability for Prescription Drugs: The Restatement (Third) Standard Versus
a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76, 79–80 (1994) (“Scholars appear nearly
unanimous in their criticism of the original language of comment k as a model of
confusion.”); Margaret Gilhooley, When Drugs Are Safe for Some but Not Others: The FDA
Experience and Alternatives for Products Liability, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 927, 929 (1999) (“The
Restatement’s ‘defect test’ has been the subject of critical commentary that has been
primarily focused on whether a reasonable alternative design should be considered in
determining whether a drug poses unreasonable risks and is thus defective, and
whether the defect test should be based on the assessment of a reasonable
manufacturer rather than a reasonable provider.”); Michael D. Green, Prescription
Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the Restatement (Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON
HALL L. REV. 207, 209 (1999) (exploring the reasons for the differential treatment for
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now famous “comment k” dealing with unavoidably unsafe products
has been recounted many times,3 and courts have given at least eight
different interpretations as to its meaning.4 But all this debate as to the
correct common law rule for drug design liability may be overshadowed,
and perhaps rendered moot, by the expanded preemption doctrine set
forth in recent United States Supreme Court cases.
The United States Supreme Court’s holding in Mutual
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett 5 that manufacturers of generic drugs are
immune from defective drug design claims has opened a debate about
whether design claims against manufacturers of brand name drugs are

defects in pharmaceuticals); James A. Henderson, Jr., Prescription Drug Design Liability
Under the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reporter’s Perspective, 48 RUTGERS L. REV.
471, 494 (1996) (explaining how courts’ varied approaches to prescription drug defect
has led to confusion); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are
Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151, 151–52 (2001) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Drug
Designs Are Different] (responding to Conk’s criticism of the RESTATEMENT’s
reinterpretation of pharmaceutical liability); David G. Owen, Dangers in Prescription
Drugs: Filling a Private Law Gap in the Healthcare Debate, 42 CONN. L. REV. 733, 743–45
(2010) (recognizing courts’ confusion when applying the exemptions of comment k);
Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Tort
Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 854–56 (1983) (commenting on the debate over
whether pharmaceutical companies should be held strictly liable for their products);
Victor E. Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning and Policy Behind
Comment K, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1139–40 (1985) (highlighting that scholars
have found the RESTATEMENT’s definition of product liability “obscure” or
“meaningless”); Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, A Prescription for Drug Liability and
Regulation, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 136–37 (2005) (highlighting the divide in courtrooms
in that some judges will seek “justice” for the claimants while others will adhere to
fundamental principles of tort law); Sidney H. Willig, The Comment k Character: A
Conceptual Barrier to Strict Liability, 29 MERCER L. REV. 545, 546–50 (1978) (raising many
questions for how comment k should apply the product liability cases).
3. See supra note 2. Most recently, the Author joined with Professor James A.
Henderson, Jr. to set forth their views as to the meaning of comment k in James A.
Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Design Liability: Farewell to Comment k, 67
BAYLOR L. REV. 521 (2015) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Farewell to Comment k].
4. See Henderson & Twerski, Farewell to Comment k, supra note 3, at 542–44
(demonstrating that courts’ interpretations of comment k range from holding that
manufacturers of prescription drugs are entitled to escape liability for drug designs
completely; that it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove that the risks of a drug outweigh
its benefits; and that it is a defendant’s burden to prove that a drug’s benefits outweigh
its risks). Per the Restatement, unavoidably unsafe products are products that “are
quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use,” as with drugs
that pose a high degree of risk in addition to some valuable therapeutic benefit. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. k (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
5. 570 U.S. 472 (2013).

284

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:281

preempted as well.6 This Essay argues that Bartlett was wrongly decided
because the Court did not understand New Hampshire law.7 Had the
Court properly understood New Hampshire law, it is possible that it
would not have preempted the design claim. This Essay will examine
the various claims that fly under the banner of drug “design defect”
and conclude that some are, or should be, federally preempted.
However, this Essay also acknowledges that some claims may not be
preempted, though to recognize such claims would constitute very bad
common law. To cut through the maze of issues, Part I will undertake
an analysis of Bartlett and demonstrate why the Court’s failure to
understand New Hampshire product liability law may have led to an
erroneous decision. Part II will examine the three types of drug design
defect claims that are subject to risk-utility balancing. The first type
seeks recovery on the grounds that the drug manufacturer should have
adopted a reasonable alternative design (RAD). The second type
attacks the design of the drug on the grounds that taking into account
the usage of the drug by all patients the drug’s risks outweigh its utility,
although the drug may be useful to at least one class of patients. The
third type challenges the drug on the grounds that no reasonable
health provider would prescribe the drug for any class of patients. For
each type of claim, Part II of this Essay will assess whether it constitutes
a valid common law claim, and whether it is or will be federally
preempted. Part II will also suggest the claims of drug design that may

6. See id. at 490 (explaining that the state-law-based design defect claims were
preempted because New Hampshire law, which required a manufacturer to make a
drug safer by altering its composition or labeling, conflicted with federal law, which
prohibited a manufacturer from making such unilateral changes); see also cases cited
infra notes 84–86; Bexis, “Pre-Approval” Design Defects—No Such Thing, DRUG & DEVICE
LAW (May 8, 2017), http://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2017/05/pre-approvaldesign-defects-%E2%88%92-no-such-thing.html; Frederick G. Helmsing, Jr.,
Preemption of Design Defect Claims Involving Brand-Name Drugs, IN-HOUSE DEF. Q., 36
(Spring 2016), https://www.mcdowellknight.com/wp-content/uploads/HelmsingInHouse-Defense-Quarterly.pdf; Eric Lindenfeld, Brand Name Preemption: The New
Frontier in Pharmaceutical Product Liability Litigation, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 636, 636–38
(2017); Derek M. Stikeleather & Brian M. Lands, Courts Increasingly Recognize Federal
Preemption of Claims Involving All FDA-Approved Medications, FOR THE DEF., Sept. 2016, at
53, https://www.gdldlaw.com/site/rte_uploads/files/FTD-1609-Stikeleather-Lands.
pdf; Symposium, Liability for Defective Drug and Medical Device Design, BROOKLYN LAW
SCHOOL (2018), https://www.brooklaw.edu/newsandevents/events/2018/02-09-2018
(Paul D. Rheingold, Professors Anita Bernstein, Mark Geistfeld, Catherine M. Sharkey,
and Aaron Twerski presented at this event).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 47–67.
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not be subject to preemption. This Essay will conclude that the Court’s
drug preemption decisions have created a sea change in the law and
that defective drug litigation will in the future focus almost entirely on
failure to warn claims.
I.

MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO. V. BARTLETT: WHERE THE
COURT WENT WRONG

In December 2004, Karen Bartlett consulted Dr. Tahsin Ergin
regarding pain in her right shoulder.8 Dr. Ergin prescribed a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID), Clinoril, to alleviate the
pain.9 Bartlett took the prescription to a local New Hampshire
pharmacy, which filled the prescription with Sulindac, a generic
substitute of Clinoril, manufactured by Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.
(Mutual).10 Within weeks of taking Sulindac, Bartlett contracted
Steven-Johnson Syndrome (SJS) and toxic epidermal necrolysis
(TEN).11 According to the court, “[Bartlett] spent about three months
in the hospital recovering, two of them in a medically induced coma,
and emerged with permanent injuries, including blindness.”12
Bartlett initially brought suit in the New Hampshire Superior Court
alleging state law claims in strict liability, negligence, and fraud.13 The
strict liability and negligence claims were predicated on failure to warn
about the safety risks and defective design of Sulindac.14 The defendant,
Mutual, removed the case to the New Hampshire federal district court.15

8.
9.
10.
11.

Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 731 F. Supp. 2d 135, 142 (D.N.H. 2010).
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also LISTER HILL NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOMEDICAL COMMC’NS., NIH, GENETICS
HOME REFERENCE: STEVENS-JOHNSON SYNDROME/TOXIC EPIDERMAL NECROLYSIS 1
(2018), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/stevens-johnson-syndrome-toxic-epiderm
al-necrolysis (describing SJS and TEN as “severe skin reaction[s] most often triggered
by particular medications,” which begin with flu-like symptoms and progress to painful
blistering of the skin and mucous membranes).
12. Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 142; see also Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 760 F. Supp.
2d 220, 262 (D.N.H. 2011) (describing that Bartlett “suffered burns and lost skin over
nearly two-thirds of her body; . . . lost her sight . . . ; lost the ability to have sexual
intercourse due to vaginal injuries; . . . lost the ability to eat normally due to
esophageal stricture . . . ; lost the ability to engage in aerobic activities . . . due to lung
injuries; . . . suffered scarring to her face, back, anus, and vagina; and . . . suffers from
post-traumatic stress disorder”).
13. Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 143.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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After discovery, Mutual moved for summary judgment on all claims,
including the failure to warn and defective design claims.16 The district
court held that enough evidence existed to warrant denying summary
judgment on whether the drug’s label contained adequate warnings,17 but
the court then found that Bartlett had not made out a prima facie case on
causation.18 In order to establish causation, Bartlett needed to prove that
Dr. Ergin would not have used Sulindac, or would have used it differently,
had the defendant provided an adequate warning. Bartlett could not
prove this, however, because Dr. Ergin admitted that he never reviewed
Sulindac’s label. The court concluded that, even if Mutual had a duty to
provide a stronger warning, it would not have affected Dr. Ergin’s
prescribing decision since he would not have read it.19 As to the defective
16. Id. at 144.
17. See id. at 144–46 (observing also that Mutual was “much closer to meeting the
summary judgment standard than Bartlett” on the failure to warn issue, but concluding
on the record before it that this issue was for the jury).
18. Id. at 145–46.
19. See id. at 143, 145–46 (pointing out that Dr. Ergin testified that “nothing about
[Sulindac’s label] influenced [his] prescribing of the drug” and that Dr. Ergin
admitted he also did not consult the brand name drug’s identical label “in detail”
before prescribing Sulindac, relying instead on his background knowledge of other
drugs similar to Sulindac). The inability to establish cause-in-fact in pharmaceutical
failure to warn cases has been an important factor in motivating plaintiffs to allege
defective drug design. See Henderson & Twerski, Farewell to Comment k, supra note 3, at
539–40. Claims based on defective drug design remove the issue of whether an
inadequate warning was actually read and acted upon because a drug that is indeed
defective should not have been marketed and prescribed in the first place. Id. For
example, there is little question that Sulindac caused the severe injuries suffered by
Bartlett. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 478 (2013) (“In a very small
number of patients, . . . both Sulindac and popular NSAIDs . . . have the serious side
effect of causing two hypersensitivity skin reactions . . . : toxic epidermal necrolysis,
and . . . Stevens-Johnson Syndrome.”). Courts have granted summary judgment for
defendants on the failure to warn issue where the treating physician’ testifies that he
or she would not have read or heeded a stronger warning. See, e.g., In re Fosamax
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:0b-MD-1789-JFK, 2010 WL 1257299, at *5, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
26, 2010) (granting the pharmaceutical company’s motion for judgment as a matter
of law regarding the plaintiff’s failure to warn claim, finding that her physician’s
testimony regarding warnings of a drug’s efficacy was not sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant failed to warn of a specific risk); Miller
v. Alza Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (“[W]here the treating
physician unequivocally testifies that s/he would have prescribed the subject drug
despite adequate warnings, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.”); see also
Wright v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 06-CV-4183-NKL, 2008 WL 1820902, at *3 (W.D.
Mo. Apr. 18, 2008) (explaining that “the failure of a drug manufacturer to provide . . .
an adequate warning of risks associated with a prescription product is ‘not the proximate
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design claim, the court, after a review of the evidence, found that a
reasonable jury could find that Sulindac was unreasonably dangerous.20
The case then went to trial solely on the issue of design defect to
decide whether Sulindac’s risks outweighed its utility.21 Mutual argued
throughout that, under New Hampshire product liability law, a
plaintiff must establish that a RAD existed.22 The court, relying on
several recent New Hampshire cases, held that a plaintiff need only
prove that a drug’s risks outweighed its utility.23 In another lengthy
opinion, the court reviewed the expert testimony and found it
sufficiently credible for jury determination.24 The jury found for
Bartlett in the amount of $21.06 million.25
Mutual appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit.26 In the interim between the district court’s decision and the
First Circuit’s affirmance, the Supreme Court decided PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing,27 holding that any failure to warn claim against a generic drug
manufacturer was preempted on the ground that the Hatch-Waxman

cause of a patient’s injury if the prescribing physician had independent knowledge of
the risk that the adequate warning should have communicated” (quoting Lachance v.
Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 01-0890-CV-W-ODS, 2006 WL 89850, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Jan.
13, 2006))); Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1196–97 (D.N.M. 2008)
(citing extensive authority that if the physician knew of the risk or would have prescribed
the drug in any event, the drug manufacturer’s failure to warn of the risk is not the
proximate cause of the patient’s injury). For a comprehensive state-by-state compilation
of the law regarding failed proof of causation when health-care providers testify that they
never read warnings provided by the drug manufacturer, see Bexis, Don’t Forget About a Prescribing
Physician’s Failure to Read Warnings, DRUG & DEVICE LAW (Oct. 17, 2013),
http://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2013/10/dont-forget-about-prescribing.html.
20. Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 149, 151 (rejecting Mutual’s argument that Bartlett’s
strict liability and negligence claims were “really failure[]to[]warn claims because the
only ‘defect’ that Bartlett allege[d] [wa]s an inadequate safety warning” and
responding that Bartlett alleged that “Sulindac [wa]s defective because its safety risks
outweigh its medical benefits, making it an unreasonably dangerous product”).
21. See Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220, 227, 229 (D.N.H. 2011).
22. Id. at 229–30, 241–42.
23. Id. at 241–42.
24. Id. at 232–41 (discussing as evidence that Sulindac’s risks outweighed its
benefits as a pain reliever for adult shoulder pain, inter alia, 133 reports to the FDA of
SJS and TEN attributed to Sulindac over the past twenty-five years, including twentynine reported fatalities, and FDA’s estimates that ninety percent of cases go
unreported, which together allowed Bartlett to argue that it was possible to infer that
Sulindac had caused hundreds of deaths over twenty-five years).
25. Id. at 227.
26. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2012).
27. 564 U.S. 604 (2011).
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Act28 prohibited generic manufacturers from independently changing
the content of warning labels.29 Thus, even if the manufacturer had
asked the FDA for help in strengthening the corresponding brand
name warning label, it still would not have satisfied the state-law
requirement for adequate labeling so as to avoid a failure to warn
claim.30 Because only a unilateral change to its labeling would have
put Mutual in compliance with state law, it was impossible for Mutual
to comply simultaneously with the state law requiring change and the
federal law requiring adherence to the brand name drug’s label.31
Mutual seized on PLIVA to argue that it could not effectuate a change
to the design of Sulindac, and thus the design claim should be
preempted as well.32 The First Circuit rejected the argument on the
grounds that New Hampshire law did not require a change in the
design or a RAD in order to declare a drug unreasonably dangerous.33
The court could simply perform risk-utility balancing to find that a
drug’s risks outweighed it benefits and assess damages accordingly.34
The stage was now set for review by the Supreme Court.35 Justice
Alito, after setting out the facts and the relevant federal statutes, set
out to prove that Mutual was faced with an “impossibility” problem
because it could not comply with its state-law tort duty to strengthen its
warning on Sulindac’s label and its federal law duty to not alter
Sulindac’s label.36 To justify his position, Justice Alito found that New
Hampshire’s version of strict liability is regulatory and imposes a duty
on a manufacturer to either improve its warning or change its design.37

28. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act
of 1984 § 101, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012) (setting forth the “abbreviated new drug
applications” requirements that a manufacturer must meet in order to market a
generic drug, including requirements that the new drug have the same active
ingredient(s); the same route of administration, dosage, and strength, or the same
biochemical effect; and the same labeling as that of the brand name drug).
29. PLIVA, Inc., 564 U.S. at 618–19.
30. See id. at 619 (“State law demanded a safer label; it did not instruct the
Manufacturers to communicate with the FDA about the possibility of a safer label.”).
31. Id. at 618–19.
32. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 37 (1st Cir. 2012).
33. Id. at 35–36.
34. See id. at 35–38 (holding, as to Mutual’s argument that the design claim was
preempted, that it would need to await final word from the Supreme Court as to whether
the Supreme Court would broaden the PLIVA warning exception to drug design cases).
35. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013).
36. See id. at 475–76.
37. Id. at 480–82.
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His opinion correctly states that New Hampshire is committed to a riskutility balancing approach and then goes on to say:
While the set of factors to be considered is ultimately an open one,
the New Hampshire Supreme Court has repeatedly identified three
factors as germane to the risk-utility inquiry: “the usefulness and
desirability of the product to the public as a whole, whether the risk
of danger could have been reduced without significantly affecting
either the product’s effectiveness or manufacturing cost, and the
presence and efficacy of a warning to avoid an unreasonable risk of
harm from hidden dangers or from foreseeable uses.”38

Justice Alito then decided that since Mutual could not redesign
Sulindac because the Hatch-Waxman Act prohibits a generic
manufacturer from altering the chemical composition of the brand
name drug, the only way that the manufacturer could make the drug
safer would be to alter the warning.39 However, since under PLIVA, a
generic manufacturer is not permitted to change the warnings from
that given by the name brand manufacturer, Mutual was placed in an
impossible position; it could not comply with both New Hampshire
products liability law and the federal mandate of the Hatch-Waxman
Act.40 The key to this conclusion was that under New Hampshire law,
the drug manufacturer has a tort duty that it can fulfill only by either
improving the warning or altering the chemical composition of
Sulindac.41 Since by federal law, the manufacturer may do neither, the
plaintiffs were preempted from bringing their action.42
Finally, Justice Alito confronted an argument set forth in the First
Circuit’s opinion that would have supported the imposition of
damages even though the plaintiff was preempted from asserting its
common-law action.43 The court of appeals had held that the
defendant, realizing that its warning on Sulindac was inadequate, had
the option to “stop selling” Sulindac, thus removing the drug from the
market, in order to avoid tort liability.44 In a sharp retort, Justice Alito’s
majority opinion held that “[a]dopting the First Circuit’s stop-selling
rationale would mean . . . the vast majority—if not all—of the cases in
38. Id. at 483 (quoting Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178,
1182 (N.H. 2001)).
39. Id. at 483–84.
40. Id. at 486–87.
41. Id. at 480–82.
42. Id. at 483–87.
43. Id. at 488 (citing Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 37–38 (1st Cir. 2012)).
44. Id.; see also Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 37.
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which the Court has found impossibility pre-emption, were wrongly
decided.”45 Just as in PLIVA, the simple expedient of leaving the
market was argued but given no consideration by the Court.46
Justice Alito erred in his reading of New Hampshire law and
misconstrued the leading case on the issue of unreasonable danger,
Vautour v. Body Master Sport Industries, Inc.47 In Vautour, the plaintiff was
injured while operating a leg press exercise machine manufactured by
the defendant.48 The leg press machine bore a warning regarding
proper use, which the plaintiff failed to heed; as a result, the plaintiff
suffered serious injury.49 The plaintiff argued that the machine was
defectively designed but did not propose an alternative design that would
have avoided the injury.50 Section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability requires that, in order to prevail in a design defect case,
a plaintiff must present evidence of a RAD that could have prevented the
plaintiff’s harm.51 The New Hampshire court rejected the RAD
requirement.52 Instead, it would suffice for the jury to find that the leg press
machine was unreasonably dangerous utilizing risk-utility balancing.53
In a casebook that this Author co-wrote, we express confusion
regarding the Vautour holding.54 In performing risk-utility balancing,
there are only two options: either the product can be made safer by
better warnings or a RAD, or else the product is so dangerous that it
should not have been marketed at all.55 Thus, if the warning on the
leg press machine was adequate and no RAD was available, the risk45. Mut. Pharm. Co., 570 U.S. at 489.
46. Id. at 489–90.
47. 784 A.2d 1178 (N.H. 2001).
48. Id. at 1180.
49. Id.
50. See id. (describing the machine as designed with two fixed safety stops that the
user was warned to engage when doing calf exercises and recounting the plaintiff’s
expert’s admission that his recommendation of adjustable rather than fixed stops
similarly would not have prevented injury if the user failed to manually engage the stops).
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST.
1998); see also Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1182–84 (discussing at length the court’s reasons
for rejecting the Restatement test and opting instead for a risk-utility test that would
allow a jury to decide whether a product was unreasonably dangerous).
52. Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1182–84.
53. See id. at 1182, 1184.
54. AARON D. TWERSKI ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 653–54 (4th ed. 2017).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 58–62 (explaining that imposing liability
when a product cannot be made safer either by a better warning or a RAD requires the
manufacturer to pay damages to all those injured by the product, meaning a
manufacturer may instead simply stop manufacturing the product).
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utility formula simply says if you cannot make it better, then do not
market the product. Products liability cognoscenti refer to this form
of absolute liability as “category liability.”56 The most famous case
supporting category liability is O’Brien v. Muskin Corp.57 In that case,
the plaintiff was seriously injured when he dove from a considerable
height into an above-ground swimming pool.58 The plaintiff argued
that his injury was brought about by the vinyl lining on the bottom of
the pool, which made the pool slippery.59 The case proceeded on the
premise that there was no reasonable alternative design to the vinyl
liner.60 The New Jersey Supreme Court was clear that, even absent a
RAD, liability could attach under risk-utility balancing.61 The court held:
The evaluation of the utility of a product also involves the relative
need for that product; some products are essentials, while others are
luxuries. A product that fills a critical need and can be designed in
only one way should be viewed differently from a luxury item. Still
other products, including some for which no alternative exists, are
so dangerous and of such little use that under the risk-utility analysis,
a manufacturer would bear the cost of liability of harm to others.

56. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2, at 618 (“Whether courts
properly may assign such ‘product category liability’ has been characterized as the ‘last
frontier’ of products liability law: a borderland at the edge of law where fights erupt
over whether manufacturers should be held responsible, without the usual proofs of
defect, for selling products adjudged by a court or jury to be more bad than good.”);
Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile
Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1611, 1628 (2017)
(proclaiming that “courts have roundly rejected” categorical liability claims in order
“[t]o preserve the role of informed consumer choice across product categories”);
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability
Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1298–1300, 1305–
07, 1316–18 (1991) (asserting that courts are not competent to assess product-category
liability and explaining that product-category liability, unlike design-defect liability,
does not involve “merely a marginal design variation,” but instead an allegedly unsafe
distinguishing feature of a product that, if altered, would place the product in a
completely different product category); David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the
“Strict” Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 774–75 n.139 (1996) (stating
disapprovingly that some courts have framed risk-utility analysis “in terms of the overall
costs and benefits of the product design taken as a whole,” rather than the “‘marginal[] risks
and benefits of adopting the particular design safety feature proposed by the plaintiff”).
57. 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983), superseded by statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(a)(1)–
(2) (West 2018).
58. O’Brien, 463 A.2d at 302.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 302–03.
61. Id. at 306.
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That cost might dissuade a manufacturer from placing the product
on the market, even if the product has been made as safely as
possible. Indeed, plaintiff contends that above-ground pools with
vinyl liners are such products and that manufacturers who market
those pools should bear the cost of injuries they cause to foreseeable
users.62

O’Brien is not the only case advocating category liability—several
other courts have done so.63 A cadre of academics also support liability
on this basis.64 Professor Henderson and this Author have written
extensively about the issue in law journals and in our casebook.65 This
is not the forum to rehash our strong objection to the idea. The point
is that New Hampshire has embraced it. Thus, liability was not
regulatory in the sense that Justice Alito set forth in Bartlett. New
Hampshire did not impose a duty on Mutual to develop a better
warning nor did it require Mutual to redesign Sulindac.66 It simply
allowed a jury to find that the Sulindac, as designed with the warnings

62. Id. The court went on to say:
A critical issue at trial was whether the design of the pool, calling for a vinyl
bottom in a pool four feet deep, was defective. The trial court should have
permitted the jury to consider whether, because of the dimensions of the pool
and slipperiness of the bottom, the risks of injury so outweighed the utility of
the product as to constitute a defect. In removing that issue from
consideration by the jury, the trial court erred. To establish sufficient proof
to compel submission of the issue to the jury for appropriate fact-finding
under risk-utility analysis, it was not necessary for plaintiff to prove the
existence of alternative, safer designs. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, even if there are no alternative methods of making
bottoms for above-ground pools, the jury might have found that the risk posed
by the pool outweighed its utility.
Id.
63. See, e.g., Bowersfield v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d 612, 618–19 (E.D.
Pa. 2000); Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc., 152 A.3d 1183, 1203 (Conn. 2016) (“A plaintiff
may . . . allege that a product . . . was too dangerous to market to the consumer
irrespective of whether it could have been designed to be safer . . . .”); Halphen v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 113–14 (La. 1986), superseded by statute, LA.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56 (2018).
64. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of
Products Liability, 60 MO. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1995); Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in
Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third
Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429, 1454 (1994).
65. See supra notes 54, 56.
66. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 503 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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as given, was unreasonably dangerous.67 Justice Sotomayor, in her
dissent, was quite correct when she said:
The court first told the jury to determine whether [S]ulindac was
unreasonably dangerous by weighing its danger against its utility.
The court further instructed the jury that if it determined that
[S]ulindac was unreasonably dangerous without reference to the
warning label, it could then consider the presence and efficacy of
the label to evaluate whether the product was unreasonably
dangerous “even with its warning.” In other words, to hold Mutual
liable, the jury was required to find that [S]ulindac “was
unreasonably dangerous despite its warning, not because of it.” The
District Court also explained to the jury that because Bartlett’s claim
addressed only whether [S]ulindac’s design was defective, Mutual’s
conduct, “which included any failure to change its warning, was ‘not
relevant to this case.’”68

Deciding that New Hampshire products liability law allows a court to
impose liability whenever the risk of a product outweighs its utility,
does not end the inquiry as to whether plaintiffs should have been
preempted from bringing their design defect claim. Justice Alito
specifies that his decision preempting Bartlett’s design claim is
predicated on the “regulatory” nature of New Hampshire’s product
liability law that imposes duties that Mutual could not fulfill without
running afoul of federal law.69 He leaves open the question as to
whether Bartlett’s design claim would have been preempted if New
Hampshire imposed “absolute liability.”70 In a telling footnote, he says,
“We can thus save for another day the question whether a true
absolute-liability state-law system could give rise to impossibility
preemption. As we have noted, most common law causes of action for
negligence and strict liability do not exist merely to spread risk, but
rather impose affirmative duties.”71
Justice Alito does not define the term “absolute liability,” but by
contrasting it with the affirmative duty either to impose better warnings
or an alternative design, he must mean risk-utility balancing that holds
a manufacturer absolutely liable even though the product has
adequate warnings and no RAD is available. One takes the product as
it is and decides whether its risks outweigh its utility. That is the very
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id.
Id. at 509–10 (citations omitted).
Id. at 480–82 (majority opinion).
Id. at 482 n.1.
Id. (citations omitted).
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situation the Court would have faced if it had correctly interpreted
New Hampshire law. Thus, rather than saving the question for another
day, the Court should have directly confronted preemption for
“absolute liability.” Since the Court did not face that question, this
Essay will explore whether preemption of design liability is appropriate
under a regime of absolute liability for drug design.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE THREE TYPES OF DRUG DESIGN CLAIMS
FOR PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
Before examining the scope of preemption brought about by PLIVA
and Bartlett, it is necessary to examine the three types of drug design
claims. The degree of their validity as common law claims is inexorably
tied to the likelihood that they will be federally preempted.
A. Reasonable Alternative Design Test for Defective Drug Design
1.

Post-FDA Approval of the Drug
It is irrational to believe that a court should entertain a claim that a
prescription drug should be declared defective in design because its
manufacturer should have developed a reasonable alternative drug
that would reduce the risk to the patient while still preserving the
drug’s benefit.72 In an earlier publication, my co-author and I argue
that it is beyond the competence of courts to decide whether a RAD
for a drug should have been developed.73 For any drug to be marketed
in the United States, it must obtain Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approval.74 Any major change in the chemical composition of
a drug requires that the applicant submit a New Drug Application
(NDA).75 That essay details the long and arduous process for obtaining
FDA approval. First, the applicant must submit an investigational drug
application (IND) to allow the applicant to conduct clinical trials.76
After approval is obtained, the drug goes through three critical phases
that test the safety and the efficiency of the drug to first a limited group

72. One commentator advocates applying the RAD test set forth in Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b) that governs products in general to drug
designs. See, e.g., Conk, supra note 2, at 1088–90.
73. Henderson & Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, supra note 2, at 163–67.
74. Bartlett, 570 U.S. at 484.
75. Id. at 476–77.
76. Henderson & Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, supra note 2, at 164.
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of patients, and then to a large cadre of patients.77 During any stage of
the process, the FDA may reject the drug or require modifications.78
The vetting can take over a decade79 and can cost several billion
dollars.80 The FDA has found that a new compound entering initial
clinical testing is estimated to have only an eight percent chance of
reaching market.81 No court could confidently predict that a RAD
proposed by a litigant would ever be approved. A strong majority of
commentators agree that a RAD test is simply unworkable.82
However, post-Bartlett, it would seem quite clear that, for a drug that
has received FDA approval, any argument that it can be modified by a
RAD is federally preempted. Justice Alito’s reasoning leaves little
doubt when he said that “once a drug—whether generic or brand
name—is approved, the manufacturer is prohibited from making any
major changes to the ‘qualitative or quantitative formulation of the
drug.’”83 If a court were to find a post-FDA approval drug to be a RAD,
it would almost certainly be struck down on the same impossibility
grounds set forth in Bartlett.84

77. Id. at 165.
78. Id.
79. See JAMES T. O’REILLY & KATHERINE A. VAN TASSEL, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
§ 13.1 (4th ed. 2017).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 18.2 (arguing
designing a drug that would pass the RAD test is impossible); Michael D. Green, supra
note 2, at 219–20 (arguing there are no possible changes that can be made to several
types of drugs); David S. Torborg, Comment, Design Defect Liability and Prescription
Drugs: Who’s in Charge?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 633, 649 (1998) (arguing a new test needs to
be developed by FDA experts, not juries and judges).
83. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 477 (2013) (citation omitted).
84. See Yates v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 808 F.3d 281, 298 (6th Cir.
2015); Fortner v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 17cv1562 (DLC), 2017 WL 3193928, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2017); Utts v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 226 F. Supp. 3d 166, 185–
86 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Rheinfrank v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1040–41
(S.D. Ohio 2015); Small v. Amgen, Inc., No. 2:12–cv–476–FtM–29MRM, 2016 WL
7228863, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2016); Barcal v. EMD Serono, Inc., No. 5:14-cv01709-MHH, 2016 WL 1086028, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 21, 2016); Batoh v. McNeil-PPC,
Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 296, 322 (D. Conn. 2016); Fleming v. Janssen Pharms., Inc., 186
F. Supp. 3d 826, 832–34 (W.D. Tenn. 2016). But see Warren v. Boehringer Ingleheim
Pharms., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01326-SEB-DML, 2017 WL 3970666, at *9–15 (S.D. Ind. Sept.
8, 2017) (explaining that the impossibility pre-emption did not apply because Bartlett
did not stand for the proposition that “every successful state law design defect claim
will impose a change on the design of drug requiring FDA approval before it is made”).
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2.

Pre-FDA Approval of Drug
Seeking to avoid the almost certain preemption of design claims
attacking a drug that has already been approved by the FDA, plaintiffs
have sought to preserve the design claim by moving it forward. The
new claim is that the drug manufacturer should have submitted a RAD
to the FDA at the outset, instead of the drug that ultimately was
approved.85 Although several courts have bought into this theory,86
many have not.87 First, the selfsame arguments presented for negating
the presentation of a RAD post-FDA approval apply with equal force to
pre-FDA approval claims. Requesting courts to compress a process that
takes the FDA a decade or more is ludicrous. A trial of several weeks
cannot compare to the FDA’s layers of animal and human testing,
which assure a drug’s safety and efficacy. As noted earlier, only a small
percentage of drugs proposed to the FDA ever pass the initial IND level
and even fewer meet final approval.88 How a court could censure a
manufacturer for not developing a different drug without any
assurance of its safety by the FDA is beyond comprehension.89
As to preemption, the court in PLIVA made short order of the
argument that a plaintiff could challenge an FDA approved drug based

85. For a list of cases in which the plaintiff has made this claim, see infra note 86.
86. See, e.g., In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Products Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2592, 2017 WL
1395312, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 13, 2017); Young v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 4:16-CV00108-DMB-JMV, 2017 WL 706320, at *8 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 22, 2017); Guidry v. Janssen
Pharms., Inc., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1206–09 (E.D. La. 2016); Sullivan v. Aventis, Inc., No.
14-cv-2939-NSR, 2015 WL 4879112, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2015); Estate of Cassel v. Alza
Corp., No. 12-cv-771-WMC, 2014 WL 856023, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 5, 2014).
87. See, e.g., Yates, 808 F.3d at 299–300; Gustavesen v. Alcon Labs. Inc., 272 F. Supp.
3d 241, 254–55 (D. Mass. 2017); Fortner, 2017 WL 3193928, at *2; Utts, 226 F. Supp. 3d
at 185–86; Small, 2016 WL 7228863, at *4; Fleming, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 832–33.
88. Henderson & Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, supra note 2, at 164, 166.
89. It is difficult conjure a common law pre-sale duty for failure to develop a drug.
In one sense, all RAD’s should have been developed before put on the market. Yet,
prior to sale, nothing has occurred to impose liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“The rule stated in this Section applies
only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, in a condition . . .
which will be unreasonably dangerous” to [the ultimate consumer].”); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (“A product is
defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, . . . is defective in design . . . .”). The
notion that a duty exists prior to the time of sale is simply foreign to products liability
law. Prior to the time of sale, a manufacturer always has the option to withdraw its
product from the market. In the case of drugs, a pre-sale theory is nonsensical because
the FDA regularly rejects proposed drugs and there can be no assurance that a drug
will be allowed on the market until final approval is given. See Beck, supra note 6.
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on the supposition of what the FDA might do if asked to respond to a
change.90 PLIVA involved a generic drug that had to be the exact
equivalent of the brand name drug both with regard to its chemical
composition and its labeling. The generic drug manufacturer did not
have the same option available to the brand name drug of
strengthening the warnings by submitting a “change being effected”
warning to the FDA.91 Plaintiffs argued that “if the Manufacturers had
asked the FDA for help in changing the corresponding brand name
label, they might eventually have been able to accomplish under
federal law what state law requires.”92 The Court rejected the
argument saying that, “[t]he question for ‘impossibility’ is whether the
private party could independently do under federal law what state law
requires of it.”93 To do as plaintiffs asked “would render conflict preemption largely meaningless because it would make most conflicts
between state and federal law illusory.”94 None of the cases opting for
the “pre-approval theory” have adequately responded to either the
common law or preemption arguments that negate this novel theory.
3.

Aggregative Risk-Utility Balancing: What Does It Mean and Should It
Be Preempted in Drug Design Cases?
For products liability design defect cases predicated on risk-utility
balancing, the majority of courts require a plaintiff to prove the
availability of a RAD.95 It is important to understand that requiring a
RAD may condemn a defendant’s design even if the design under
attack may be preferred by one or more classes of users or consumers.
For example, in Uloth v. City Tank Corp.,96 a garbage truck was designed

90. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 620–21 (2011).
91. Unlike major changes to the chemical properties of a drug, a pharmaceutical
manufacturer may in some circumstances independently strengthen a warning
without first receiving FDA approval. The leading case setting for the constitutional
doctrine of preemption with regard to failure to warn drug claims is Wyeth v. Levine.
See 555 U.S. 555 (2009). A drug manufacturer that argues that the FDA would not
have approved a stronger warning must provide “clear evidence” that the FDA would
not have approved a change to the proposed label. Id. at 571.
92. PLIVA, Inc., 564 U.S. at 619.
93. Id. at 620.
94. Id.
95. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 8.5; Aaron D. Twerski & James
A. Henderson, Jr., Manufactures’ Liability for Defective Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility,
74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1079 (2009).
96. 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978).
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such that sanitation workers could suffer the loss of extremities.97 Running
the full width of the truck was a rear step on which the workers rode between
stops.98 The step was about two feet above the ground, with a four-inch-wide
loading sill located another foot above the step.99 The garbage was loaded
into the “trash hopper” area, just past the sill, where a packer blade moved
the garbage into storage area during the compaction process.100 The packer
blade acts like scissors, forming a sharp point where it touches the loading
sill.101 The problem with this design is that a sanitation worker may
inadvertently step onto the “trash hopper” or use his hand to push garbage
in before the blade reaches the garbage.102 However, RADs are available to
avert such tragedies. The truck may be designed with an interrupted cycle
so that it stops midway and requires a sanitation worker to manually engage
the blade to complete the cycle, or it may be designed with a dead man’s
control which requires the sanitation worker to have his hands on the
buttons as the blade descends.103 Under either scenario, the likelihood of
a worker losing an arm or a leg is substantially reduced.104 However, some
sanitation workers may not like these safety features. When they complete
the garbage collection for their route they may be done for the day and can
go home. If one of the workers must stand behind the truck and engage
the safety device, that worker cannot be moving to the next home to collect
the garbage. Some sanitation workers who are confident that they can
avoid injury by exercising care may prefer the more dangerous, but more
efficient, blade device. Nonetheless, when a tragedy occurs, and the
plaintiff argues that the safety device should have been installed, the RAD
disregards the preference of some sanitation workers in favor of the overall
safety of all sanitation workers.105 The risk outweighs the utility of the more
efficient, yet more dangerous, compaction chamber blade. The welfare of

97. Id. at 1190.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1190–91 (describing how the plaintiff’s foot was cut off by the packer
blade of the garbage truck).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1191.
105. For a similar analogy utilizing a consumer product as an example of RAD
recognizing aggregative risk, see Henderson & Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, supra
note 2, at 169–71 (explaining one family’s misuse of a water vaporizer causes the product
to be deemed defective therefore inhibiting another family’s correct use of the product).
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one class of workers is sacrificed to the greater number of workers who will
be exposed to serious injury.
In the case of prescription drugs, it may well be that the aggregative
risks of a drug may exceed its benefits, although the drug benefits one
or more classes of patients. Consider the following hypothetical:
ABC Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (ABC) manufacturers a drug, NOAC.
The drug is effective to treat the most severe cases of acne. NOAC
is viewed as a miracle drug for those suffering from acne who have
become recluses because they are ashamed to go out in public
because of their skin condition. One of the side effects of NOAC is
that in rare cases it can cause glaucoma. After ten years of testing,
the FDA approved the drug and mandated a black box warning on
the drug insert106 about the dangers of glaucoma and insisted that
ABC send “dear doctor” letters107 to all physicians apprising them of
the risk. The warnings also told the physicians that NOAC is not to be
prescribed for mild forms of acne and is only to be prescribed if the acne
is severe and the patient has not responded to other less dangerous antiacne drugs. ABC did not advertise the drug in the media.
Jim, an eighteen-year-old suffering from mild acne is prescribed
NOAC by Dr. X who had not read the warnings. Jim contracted
glaucoma and sued Dr. X and ABC. Jim has no failure to warn claim
against ABC because ABC warned adequately about the risk of
glaucoma and because Dr. X did not read the warnings that ABC
provided. Dr. X has one million dollars of malpractice coverage.
Jim’s damages for his reduced vision are five million dollars.
Jim alleges that NOAC is defectively designed because the drug is
unreasonably dangerous. The jury predicates its findings on the
testimony of experts that the rare cases of glaucoma causing loss of
vision is greater than the benefits of NOAC to those suffering from

106. A black box warning is the strictest warning put in the labelling of prescription
drugs by the FDA when there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious
hazard with the drug. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(1) (2011); 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e)
(2011) (for products approved before June 2001).
107. “Dear Doctor letters are an important and required document to alert health
care professionals to previously unknown adverse reactions linked to a drug, changes
in dosage that could improve a drug's effectiveness and other important information.
It is not just a letter mailed to the doctors but a process that assures that important
information regarding a prescription product is appropriately distributed.” FDAMAP,
FDA’s Requirements for a Dear Doctor Letter (Aug. 30, 2018), http://www.fdamap.com/
fda-requirements-for-a-dear-doctor-letter.html.
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severe acne due to the likelihood of misprescription by doctors to
those suffering from mild acnes.108

Should ABC be held liable based on the jury’s assessment that the
drug’s design risk outweighs its utility? Should those who need the drug
be deprived of it because in, the macro sense, it will cause too much harm
in relation to its benefit? In previous work,109 and in the Products Liability
Restatement, we took the position that it would be unfair to condemn the
drug as defectively designed and effectively remove it from the market to
the detriment of the patients who truly need the drug.110
Given Bartlett, this issue has now taken on constitutional significance.
In the hypothetical posed above, NOAC’s warnings were adequate and
there existed no alternative drug to treat severe acne. Can the state
allow a common law remedy based on a finding of unreasonable
danger, thus negating the FDA’s determination that the drug is
reasonably safe so that it is approved for marketing? As in Bartlett, ABC
had fulfilled its duty to warn, and there was no alternative drug
available to treat severe acne.111 The only avenue available to avoid
liability would be not to market NOAC. The defendant in Bartlett could
not warn because he was prevented by the Hatch-Waxman Act, and it
could not alter the design of the drug for the same reason.112 After
running out of state common law duties to make the drug safer, the
defendant was left with the sole option of not marketing a FDA
108. This is a hypothetical case and is not intended as an analogy to the litigation around
the adequacy of warning of the anti-acne drug Accutane that took place over a period of years.
See, e.g., Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 841–42 (Neb. 2000).
109. Henderson & Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, supra note 2, at 171–72.
110. The author was co-reporter with Professor James A. Henderson of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998). In Section 6 (c) Comment b,
one of the reasons that we believe it unnecessary to impose macro risk-utility on
pharmaceutical manufacturers when there exists a class of patients for whom the drug
in question was proper was that a misprescription by a physician could be dealt with by
malpractice. Henderson & Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, supra note 2, at 171.
Malpractice may, in cases of very serious injury, be an inadequate remedy. Damages may
exceed insurance coverage. In some states, malpractice damages are severely limited by
statute. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2018) ($250,000 cap on noneconomic
loss); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 ($250,000–$350,000 cap on non-economic loss
depending on years that cause of action accrued). There may be other modes of
controlling misprescriptions of dangerous drugs short of banning distribution of the
drug. See Catherine M. Sharkey, States versus FDA, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1609 (2015).
111. If a FDA approved drug would be a reasonable alternative drug that was safer
and equally effective the author would find no problem with imposing liability. See
Henderson & Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, supra note 2 at 155–59.
112. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 477 (2013).
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approved drug to avoid tort liability. This remaining option, however,
is an option that Bartlett teaches flies in the teeth of preemption
jurisprudence. Now that the “stop selling” rationale has been declared
invalid, the manufacturer is faced with the identical “impossibility”
conflict between state and federal law.
4.

Is the Restatement Test for Defective Drug Design Preempted?
The Third Restatement test for drug design defects has received
support from some state courts, but it has not been addressed by the
Supreme Court. Section 6(c) provides:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug
or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable
therapeutic benefits that reasonable healthcare providers, knowing
of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients.113

This section of the Restatement has received a lukewarm reception
by the courts.114 More recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Lance v. Wyeth,115 adopted section 6(c) as the governing rule of the
case.116 The plaintiff’s decedent, a thirty-five-year-old woman, died
after taking a weight reducing pill, Redux, for four months.117 Plaintiff
alleged that defendant, Wyeth, knew or should have known that Redux
caused pulmonary hypertension (PPH).118 Ultimately, as a result of
ingesting the drug, she contracted PPH and died.119 The court noted
that plaintiff did not present a failure to warn claim because no warning

113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
114. Mills v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. CV11-00986-PHX-FJM,
2011 WL 4708850, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2011) (acknowledging that Arizona courts
have not officially adopted the Restatement (Third) of Torts); see also Madsen v. Am.
Home Products Corp., 477 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1037 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (acknowledging
that Iowa has adopted § 6(c)); Gebhardt v. Mentor Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180, 185 (D. Ariz.
1999) (predicting that Arizona would adopt § 6 (c)), aff’d mem., 15 F. Appx. 540 (9th
Cir. 2001). Several courts have rejected § 6(c). See Fraser v. Wyeth, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d
68, 83–84 (D. Conn. 2014); In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 460, 471–
72 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying Florida law); Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d
723, 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Mele v. Howmedica, Inc., 808 N.E.2d 1026, 1038–39 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004); Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 840 (Neb. 2000).
115. 85 A.3d 434 (Pa. 2014).
116. Id. at 451.
117. Id. at 437.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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concerning Redux would have been sufficient.120 Her claim was that Redux
was so dangerously designed that no physician knowing the risk and benefits
of the drug would have prescribed the drug for any class of patients.121 The
Pennsylvania court agreed that if a jury found that the defendant had violated
the Restatement test, liability could be established.122
The Restatement test ultimately allows a common law design defect
claim to prevail over the FDA’s approval of a drug. The only thing that
a defendant can do to escape liability is to stop selling the drug—a
position that is in direct contravention of Bartlett.123 Perhaps for a drug
that is so egregiously dangerous, the Supreme Court might craft an
exception to Bartlett. But, otherwise, the Bartlett dissent is quite correct
in predicting that the majority has rendered drug design defect
immune from common law actions.124
It is difficult to predict how broad the Supreme Court would have
read its preemption doctrine had it correctly interpreted New
Hampshire product liability law in Bartlett. It is not clear whether the
decision that Sulindac was unreasonably dangerous was based on a
finding that, although it was a proper drug for some patients, it was in
the aggregate unreasonably dangerous because its overall risks
outweighed its utility or whether the facts would support a finding that
no reasonable doctor knowing of the risks of horrendous injuries
would not prescribe Sulindac for any class of patients.125 Would the
120. See id.
121. Id. at 448.
122. Id. at 447.
123. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 488 (2013).
124. Id. at 497–98 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (indicating that “federal drug law and
state common law liability have long been understood to operate in tandem to
promote consumer safety”).
125. It is likely that the jury found for plaintiff based on the theory that Sulindac
was so dangerous that it should not be prescribed for any class of patients. The trial
court’s jury instructions point in that direction:
Defective condition. In deciding whether [S]ulindac’s design presented
unreasonable danger, you should consider the usefulness and desirability of
the product to the public as a whole. A product is defective as designed if the
magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility (or usefulness) of the product.
You should also consider whether [S]ulindac’s risk of danger, if any, could
have been reduced without significant impact on the product’s effectiveness
or its manufacturing cost. Liability may exist if the manufacturer did not take
available and reasonable steps to lessen or eliminate the danger of even a
useful and desirable product.
Jury Instructions at 15, Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D.N.H. 2010)
(No. 08-cv-358-JD), 2010 WL 3500124. A careful reading of the trial court’s decision
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Supreme Court find preemption on either of the two contingencies?
The Court took the easy way out and did not confront the problem
leaving it and left it for a future court to decide the issue. This much
is certain. If the Court were to preempt all risk-utility claims set forth
in this Essay, the cause of action for design defect for drugs that has
been the subject of such contention over the years is effectively dead.
It is likely, however, that a small subset of design claims may not be
preempted. For example, in Gustavesen v. Alcon Laboratories,126
consumers brought a class action alleging that pharmaceutical
companies intentionally designed eye droppers to dispense more
liquid than the human eye is capable of absorbing.127 The FDA
approves the size of the eye dropper containers.128 Any change in the
container constitutes a “major change”129 that requires supplemental
FDA approval.130 The Court, relying on the arguments set forth earlier
in this article, held that the plaintiff’s claims were preempted.131 It is
certainly possible that the Supreme Court might take issue with the
FDA characterization of a change in volume of the drops created by
the bottle’s stopper as a “major change” requiring FDA approval, and
could find it a “minor change” that the pharmaceutical manufacturer
could undertake independently.132
CONCLUSION
The substantial likelihood that federal preemption will bar most
common law drug design suits has been created by three
pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court. Taken
together they have created the perfect storm. First, the statement by
Justice Alito in the majority opinion in Bartlett that “[o]nce a drug—
whether generic or brand name—is approved, the manufacturer is
prohibited from making any major changes to the ‘qualitative or
quantitative formulation of the drug.’”133 Second, the majority opinion
does not reveal that Sulindac was the drug of choice for other diseases. See Bartlett, 760
F. Supp. 2d at 233–40.
126. 272 F. Supp. 3d 241 (D. Mass. 2017).
127. Id. at 243, 249–50.
128. Id. at 251.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 252.
132. Id. at 250–52.
133. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 477 (2013) (quoting 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.70(b)(2)(i) (2012)).
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holding in PLIVA that the ability of a pharmaceutical manufacturer to
request changes to a drug is irrelevant to the issue of whether the drug
is preempted against common law suits. The pharmaceutical
manufacturer must be able independently to effect the change.134
Third is the holding by Justice Alito in the majority opinion in Bartlett
that one cannot avoid preemption of common law tort liability if there
is a conflict between state and federal law duties by choosing not to sell
the drug that has been approved by the FDA. The “stop selling”
solution violates basic principles of federal preemption.135 Unless the
Court will backtrack on any of these propositions, it would appear that
most common law drug design suits, whatever the common law theory
supporting such actions, will be barred.
If design defect claims are to be federally preempted, how significant
will the impact be on drug litigation? The overwhelming majority of
cases against pharmaceuticals have always been based on failure to
warn.136 If the failure to warn claim is well-founded, the plaintiffs lose
their cases primarily because the physician testifies that she never read
any warning or would have prescribed the drug even had she read a
stronger warning. Drug design, despite the fascination of scholars with
this issue, has played only a minor role in drug litigation.137 The pillars
of the republic will not fall if this questionable theory is laid to rest.

134. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 619 (2011).
135. Bartlett, 570 U.S. at 488.
136. For a list of cases where plaintiffs have brought claims for failure to warn, see
supra note 86.
137. The focus of this Essay was not to take a normative position on the wisdom of
preemption in drug design cases. The major point is that the justices in both PLIVA
and Bartlett have spoken with such clarity that this author does not see how these
decisions will not preempt design claims against manufacturers of brand name drugs.
The statements by the justices were not just dicta. They were vital to the holdings in
both cases. Others have taken a strong position on this issue of preemption of drug
design cases. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of
Preemption, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 359, 362–68 (2014) (arguing that state law
design defect and failure to warn claims are preempted by parallel federal
requirements); Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique
of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 3 (2006) (noting
that federal preemption of state tort actions for pharmaceutical companies).

